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Fragmented Ownership and Second Homes 
in Tourism Resorts
A  B  S  T  R  A  C  T
In spite of the generally accepted view that second homes induce a higher 
seasonality and a lower occupancy rate than hotels, they persistently pre-
vail in many tourism destinations. This paper introduces a mechanism to 
illustrate and analyze the decision problem of constructing second homes 
or hotels. We introduce a two period game with two players representing a 
developer of buildings in a tourism destination D and a tourist T. D owns a 
piece of land and faces two alternatives: to construct a hotel or to build a sec-
ond home. T has to choose between buying a second home or renting a hotel 
room. Another ingredient of the model is an externality mechanism repre-
senting the value placed by tourists on the probability of finding an available 
place at the destination. The paper shows the persistence of sub-optimal 
equilibria in the game, in which the land is allocated to a socially inefficient 
use (second homes rather than hotels). We show that a necessary condition 
for such inefficiency to emerge is that the related externality cannot be inter-
nalized. This occurs under a regime of dispersed ownership.
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INTRODUCTION
Second homes are defined as privately owned properties mainly used for 
vacations that are not the sole or main residence of an individual (see Müller 
2004; Accinelli, Brida, and Carrera 2007). In the period 1991-1999, the number 
of second homes grew two percent faster than the overall housing stock (Di, 
McArdle and Masnick 2001), probably as a consequence of the increase in 
individuals’ wealth. In part, this is the reason why second home tourism has 
recently commanded a considerable a�ention, both among the policy makers, 
and within the scientific community (Carliner 1990, 1998, 2002; Parsons 1992; 
Hecodk 1993; Casado 1999; Pe�erson 1999; Gallant and Tewdwr 2000, 2001; 
Tress 2002; Francese 2003; Visser 2003; Hoogendoorn and Visser 2004; Müller 
2004; Lundmark and Marjavaara 2005). The received literature highlights the 
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substantial responsibility of second homes in increasing seasonality, thereby 
reducing the demand for local business, and generating a negative spillover 
on the entire community (Pijanowski and Shellito 2003), which ultimately re-
duces overall welfare. 
However, it has not illustrated a convincing reason for the emergence or the 
persistence of this alleged inefficiency. This paper a�empts to bridge this gap, 
by indentifying a specific channel, largely consistent with the available evi-
dence, which could contribute to explaining the phenomenon. We model and 
illustrate a simple externality mechanism that may emerge under a regime of 
dispersed (or fragmented) ownership of the various recreational facilities at 
the destination, and in the presence of land use restrictions that place a bound 
on the number of buildings or on their aggregate size. For the purpose of this 
paper, we define integrated ownership as a system in which the hotel owners 
own the lateral activities of the resort (e.g. ski resorts, restaurant, and vari-
ous amenities) as well. On the contrary, we define dispersed (or fragmented) 
ownership as a system in which the hotel owners do not own the lateral activ-
ities. As a point of clarification, integration in our framework does not require 
all of the hotels being owned by the same company; it merely requires all of 
the lateral activities being owned by companies that also own a hotel.
Our argument draws on the intuition that seasonality damages the destina-
tion, as it reduces the revenue of the lateral activities of the resort, i.e. the vari-
ous businesses that operate there (for example, in a ski resort, the lifts owner). 
Also, while second homes tend to increase seasonality, hotels do reduce it. 
Inefficiency arises when second homes outnumber hotels. We then analyze a 
mechanism through which such inefficiency persists, based on an externality 
argument. In particular, a second home owner does not consider the negative 
impact due to the increased seasonality (second homes tend to be left unused 
for a large portion of the year); on the other hand, a non-integrated hotel 
owner won’t consider the positive impact that emerges for precisely the op-
posite reason (i.e. that the hotel is full). This can potentially lead to inefficien-
cies, which disappear when the hotel owner is integrated. In such case, the 
hotel owner recognizes the positive impact of its high utilization rate on the 
revenue. There are various reasons why a consumer may prefer ownership of 
a second home over rental of a hotel room, including, among others, the three 
that follow. First, he may value the certainty of having the place available 
when he decides to go, even at the last minute - something that a hotel room 
cannot ensure (we will focus on this specific benefit in our model). Second, he 
may regard it as an investment, with the prospects of future yields. Third, he 
may have a specific taste for the comfort or other features of homes, or, alter-
natively, a dislike for some specific features of hotels. 
Clearly, the preference ordering for homes and hotel is reflected in their 
relative prices, and, as a consequence, in the values of the hotel (the expected 
profit, resulting from the value that consumers a�ach to the hotel), and of the 
second home (the value that the owner a�aches to the second home itself). 
However, in spite of the consumer’s relative preference for second homes, 
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an “integrated” firm may still find it more profitable to build the hotel when 
the extra revenue generated by the collateral activities for an hotel (precisely 
due to its higher utilization rate) is larger than the consumers’ extra value for 
the second home against the hotel. For all these reasons, a piece of land may 
be mostly valued by an “integrated” firm, owning both the hotel and (a por-
tion of) the recreational facilities in the resort, followed by a consumer who is 
interested in buying a second home, and finally by a hotel owner who is not 
integrated in the lateral activities. On the other hand, an aggregate welfare-
maximizing decision would require to build the hotel. It follows that private 
and social welfare are maximized only under an integrated regime.
Our assumption of land use restrictions that place a bound on the number 
of buildings or on their aggregate size reflects a common institutional rule in 
place in many tourism resort, justified possibly by environmental concerns, 
or, more generally, by the target of a sustainable tourism. A number of papers 
have dealt with the effects of ownership restrictions on the housing market. 
For instance, (Muller 2002) analyzed foreign second home purchases in north-
ern Sweden and (Parsons 1992) focused on the price effect of land use restric-
tions. Only very recently, and for very few countries, we have documented 
data about the usage and market of second homes. For example, there are 
good description of second homes market in Sweden and sales, taxation and 
usage registers are available for this country (Müller 2004; Marjavaara and 
Müller 2007; Marjavaara 2007), but this can be regarded as an exception. 
To our knowledge, however, none of them has explicitly analyzed the 
tradeoffs between hotels and second homes in the context of sustainable 
tourism. As far as the ownership structure, they differ in the various types 
of resorts. Therefore, we observe both fragmented and integrated ownership 
(Candela, Castellani and Mussoni. 2007). The previous literature has identi-
fied a number of impacts of second homes on the environment. Such impacts 
can bring about both benefits and problems, related to a diverse range of fac-
tors that affect the sustainability of local communities. These factors, such as 
housing, services and facilities, local economies and social and cultural vital-
ity cut across a variety of policy areas, requiring effective partnership work-
ing between policy makers. However, it is important not to see the impact 
of second and holiday homes in isolation from other factors contributing to 
changes within local communities and especially other pressures as the mar-
ket of hotel facilities.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
A (self-interested) profit-maximizing developer D owns a piece of land in a 
given ski resort R, and is allowed to build a unit, which he will sell to a buyer. 
The developer has to decide whether to build a hotel (for simplicity consisting 
of a single room, or a single “bed”) or a private home (also, consisting of a sin-
gle bed). Observe that, for the purpose of the model, it would be equivalent to 
compare a second home and one used for renting. By doing so, he compares 
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the profit he gets from each of the two alternatives. If he builds a hotel, he will 
sell it to a profit-maximizing company (or individual), denoted H, which will 
manage it with the goal of profit maximization. If he builds a home, he will 
sell it to a private owner, F who will use it as a vacation home. Notice that 
another way to interpret the hotel alternative in our model is a home with a 
time sharing arrangement, while an alternative way to interpret the second 
home in our model is a home without a time sharing arrangement. Being the 
developer a (self-interested) profit-maximizer, he compares the willingness to 
pay of the two types of buyers (H and F): If H is willing to pay more than F, he 
builds a hotel and sells it to H; vice versa, if F is willing to pay more than H, he 
builds a private home and sells it to F.
The resort is active in two seasons, a peak, and an off-peak season. Clearly, 
for a mountain destination the peak would be the winter, and the off-peak 
would be summer, while for a sea destination, the opposite would be the 
case. A number of potential tourists derive utility from spending time at the 
resort, regardless of whether they stay in their private home or at a hotel. For 
simplicity, we disregard tourists who already own a second home, and do not 
derive, in this framework, any utility from either the new hotel or the new sec-
ond home. Hence, in any given period, the hotel room and the private home, 
as long as they are both used (or, clearly, both empty) yield the same utility 
to consumers. The results would hold a fortiori if, instead, we assumed that 
consumers prefer their private home over the hotel. The consumers’ utility is 
defined as:
 
where  θp and θop denote the individual values of spending time at the re-
sort respectively in peak and off-peak, and p the price the individual spends, 
which depends both on the season and on his chosen type of accommodation 
(house versus hotel). Individuals are risk neutral, and, as can be inferred from 
the previous equation, their utility differs according to whether they reach the 
destination on peak or off-peak. The resort has a mass of K beds. The game 
develops in three stages. First, the developer D chooses whether to build an 
hotel or a second home. Second, the developer sells the facility he has decided 
to build (to a private customer if it is a second home, or to a company or an 
individual manager if it’s an hotel). Third, tourists make their consumption 
decisions. They choose whether to enjoy the destination on peak, or off-peak, 
or, finally, neither in the peak nor off-peak. Those who decide to enjoy the 
destination will use their private home if they bought one, or rent an hotel 
room otherwise. We consider the following assumptions:
a) Both the house and the hotel room can host at most two consumers, one in 
peak and one off-peak, and after the game their residual value is zero. Ob-
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serve that both the house price and the hotel price are set assuming their 
life cycle lasts for the two periods of the game only. While these assump-
tions may seem unrealistic, they hold for both the hotel and the private 
home, thereby making the two alternatives homogenous and comparable; 
therefore, they are not restrictive for the purpose of the model.
b) We rule out the alternative that the private home owner rents it or shares it 
through other types of contracts. This (crucial) assumption reflects both the 
higher rigidity in the second home renting market with respect to the hotel 
market, and the empirical evidence that a large portion of second home 
owners prefer to leave the home unused  rather than renting it (see Bieger, 
Beritelli and Weinerta 2007).
c) A mass Mp of perfectly homogenous individuals has a taste for spending 
the peak season at the resort, and their utility if they reach the resort in 
peak is  θp. A mass Mop of perfectly homogenous individuals has a taste 
for spending time at the resort offpeak, and their utility is they reach the 
resort off-peak is θop. The consumers who have a taste for the peak have no 
taste for off-peak, and vice versa. This assumption reflects the segmenta-
tion - empirically observed - between the target groups for summer and 
winter tourism in mountain and sea resorts (see for instance, Meidan 1984; 
Spencer and Holecek 2007).
d)  θp  > θop, that is, the value of the destination in peak (for peak customers) ex-
ceeds the value of the destination off-peak (for non-peak customers). This 
assumption is quite natural, and corresponds to a definition of peak load in 
tourism (see Dwyer and Forsyth 2006).
e) Mp  > Mop > K. The mass of tourists potentially interested in the destination is 
larger on peak than off-peak. However, in both cases, the demand exceeds 
the hotel capacity. Observe that this assumption, coupled with the shape of 
our demand function, guarantees that the outcome is identical for a range 
of market structures covering Bertrand competition, Cournot competition 
and collusion (hence the results are invariant to the assumed type of com-
petition). While empirical observations suggest that hotels tend to remain 
partially empty in really off-peak periods, our assumption remain valid as 
long as we are willing to interpret the peak period of our model as “high 
peak” and the off-peak period of our model as “medium peak”, in the fol-
lowing sense: In “high peak” periods (for example, for a European ski resort, 
Christmas vacations), both hotels and second homes are full, while in a 
“medium peak” period (for example, for a European ski resort, February), 
hotels tend to be full, while second homes are generally unused for most 
of the month. A further justification for our assumption consists in the fact 
that hotels are increasingly using price differentiation, or yield manage-
ment, strategies aimed at increasing the occupancy rate even off-peak. 
f) The developer’s cost of building the private home and the hotel are identi-
cal, and normalized to zero for convenience, to allow for a greater degree 
of comparability between the two options.
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g) While being self-interested, the developer is part of the community; there-
fore, his profit is computed as part of the welfare accruing to the resort. 
While in practice the developer itself might be an outside entity, the license 
for building would be awarded by the community, which would then re-
tain the proceeds from the awarding procedure.
h) Hotel rooms are booked simultaneously. There is no way a consumer can 
reserve in advance and be sure to get a hotel room (This assumption is 
made only for simplicity. The results would hold even assuming a sequen-
tial process of hotel booking, but this would generate more cumbersome 
computations).
Results: Equilibrium Characterization
In equilibrium, the developer D is selling the unit to the party that values it 
the most, and is therefore willing to pay the most for it. Moreover, in equilib-
rium, as long as the hotel market is competitive, the valuation of the unit for 
each party is equal to the flow of expected profit from the unit for H, denoted 
by VH, and the flow of expected utility from the unit for F, denoted by VF. 
Hence, the developer D will sell the unit to the hotel owner H if VH  ≤ VF   ; oth-
erwise, it will sell it to the private (home) owner F. As both the hotel and the 
private home yield utility for two periods only, VH (respectively, VF) represent 
the sum of profit (respectively,  utility) in the two periods. In our framework, 
a consumer prefers the private home over the hotel only because owning the 
home insures him against the risk of not finding an available hotel room, and 
hence not being able to reach the destination in the desired period. In other 
words, the consumer values the certainty of finding an available room, which 
is not ensured by the limited hotel capacity K. It follows that a tourist wish-
ing to enjoy the destination has two alternatives. Either, he reserves an hotel 
room, where he finds an available spot with probability Pr(K) at a price p(K), 
or he buys a home, where he finds an available spot with probability 1 at a 
price PF. The consumer chooses to buy the house instead of the hotel if and 
only if the value from the home (θ - PF) (that is, the prospect of spending with 
certainty time at the resort, either in peak or off-peak) exceeds the value from 
the hotel (that is, the prospect of spending time at the resort conditionally on 
finding an available hotel room). Hence, a consumer (in peak or off-peak) pre-
fers the house over the hotel if the following condition holds:
                                        (1)
where PF is the home price. Equation 1 tells us that the tourist prefers to buy 
the house if the net value from the house (i.e., the value of enjoying the des-
tination with certainty minus the price) exceeds the net value from the hotel 
(i.e., the value of enjoying the destination minus the hotel price weighted by 
the probability of finding an available room). The individual, as previously 
discussed, is willing to spend more for the home, as he is sure of enjoying 
� � � �KpKPF ��� �� Pr
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the utility from the resort. Observe that, in principle, both an individual who 
prefers the peak, as well as one who prefers the off-peak, might be interested 
in the home. Hence the house is built if either of the following holds: θp - PF ≥ 
Prop (K) θop - pop (K)  or  θp - pF ≤ Pr
p (K)θp - pp (K). Under our assumption that the 
mass of consumers interested in the peak period exceeds the mass of custom-
ers interested in the off-peak period, and the la�er in turn exceeds the avail-
able hotel capacity (that is, Mp > Mop > K), we derive the prices: 
                                                    (2)
Under Bertrand competition, Cournot competition and collusion, this is the 
only equilibrium. To prove it, assume otherwise. If the equilibrium price is  θ 
< θp (θop) in peak (off-peak), then a firm would profitably deviate by charging 
θp (θop) and still a�ract customers (as, given  θ, there are customers who are 
willing to rent the hotel room, have a value of θp (θop) for that, but cannot find 
it). On the contrary, assume the equilibrium price is θ > θp (θop). Then, there 
are no hotel rooms rented, but a potential profit available of θp (θop). It follows 
that every firm faces a profitable deviation to θp (θop). The price schedule (2) is 
indeed an equilibrium, from which there is no profitable deviation. The prob-
ability Pr(K) of finding an available room at the hotel is given by the ratio of 
“hotel capacity-mass of tourists”, that is,
 
It follows that equation (1) becomes:
                                    (3)
A potential “peak tourist” buys the house if PF ≤ θp, while a potential “non 
peak” tourist buys the house if  PF ≤ θop. The developer, if he finds it optimal 
to build the home, maximizes his profit by selling it to the type of tourist with 
the highest value for it, reflected into a higher willingness to pay. The highest 
price a tourist is willing to spend results from
 
(as assumption d. implies that                 ). Peak tourists get the highest value from 
the home, hence they are willing to pay a higher price. It follows that, if she 
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decides to build the private home, the developer can charge: 
 
A hotel owner, on the other hand, given his pricing policy, achieves a posi-
tive profit both in peak, and off peak:
                         (4)
Equation (4) implies that the maximal price that an hotel owner is willing to 
pay for the hotel is given by θp + θop . That is the price the developer can charge 
if he decides to build the home. The developer chooses the option that maxi-
mizes his revenue (equal to its profit by assumption). Hence, the developer 
decides to build the private home if: 
                (5)
It follows that the home is built instead of the hotel if either the difference in 
value between customers who have a taste for the peak and those who have 
a taste for the off-peak is substantial, or if the probability of finding an avail-
able spot is relatively low. Observe that, differently than the hotel, the second 
home remains empty off-peak. Under this circumstance, the resort is giving 
up the revenue potentially generated by the tourist in the lateral activities in 
the off-peak period. For convenience, let us denote by VAp and VAop the extra 
value added that tourists injects in the resort, through the lateral activity, re-
spectively on-peak and off peak. Without loss of generality we did not discuss at 
least two different approaches to this important issue, such as “finance-invest-
ment” and “public financing” aspects. But recall that many of the resort second 
home is put into rental management company’s portfolio to generate cash 
flow for the owner. At least that is the case in the USA and Southern Europe.
Results: Welfare
This subsection examines explicitly the total welfare effects of the two alterna-
tives. The total welfare generated by the home results from the aggregation 
of the developer’s revenue                     (equal to the consumer’s value for the 
second home, given that the developer, in its monopsony position, is able to 
extract the full surplus from the consumers), and the external effects (denoted 
by VAp) on the economy in the peak period – the only period in which the 
second home is used. Remember that we are assuming that the developer is 
part of the community (if this is not literally true, it could still be that the local 
government is able to impose fees or taxes on the developer to hold the ho-
tel’s revenue inside the community). The total welfare from the second home 
is then:
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In turn, the aggregate value generated when the hotel is built results from 
the aggregation of the price paid by the company (or the individual) that buys 
the hotel (in turn equal to the consumers’ value for the hotel – fully extracted 
by the hotel owner), θp + θop , and the external effects on the economy in both 
periods (being the hotels fully used both in peaks and off-peak). The total wel-
fare from the hotel is therefore given by: 
Total welfare maximization coincides with profit maximization for an inte-
grated owner. Indeed, an integrated ownership, where the hotel owner owns 
the lateral activities as well, recognizes (and therefore internalizes) the exter-
nality and the extra value added generated by the hotel through the lateral 
activities off peak. Therefore, the maximization of the aggregate welfare co-
incides with the maximization problem of the integrated owner. In this case, 
the private home is built if:
                                           (6)
By comparing (5) and (6), one may notice that under integrated ownership, 
the hotel room is built more often than under fragmented ownership. Fur-
thermore, the hotel room is built when it is optimal from the viewpoint of the 
local community to do so. Observe that the inefficiency of the dispersed struc-
ture emerges when the initial number of hotels is low. In this case, the con-
sumer has a substantial chance not to find an available room, and therefore 
places a high value on the certainty provided by the second home. Hence, a 
resort with few hotels (and fragmented ownership, lack of side-payment, and 
no other forms of incentives for hotels) lies in a “second homes trap” where 
the low number of hotels induces consumers to place a high value on private 
homes. In this case, therefore, the low number of hotels persists over time. 
In other words, abundance of second homes generates more second homes, 
whereas abundance of hotels generates more hotels.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The paper shows a simple mechanism that may contribute to explaining the 
persistence of inefficient (from the resort’s community viewpoint) equilibria, 
in which the land is allocated to a socially inefficient use (second homes, 
rather than the hotels, which would increase the aggregate welfare for the 
community). This inefficiency emerges as a result of an externality problem. 
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An integrated owner, who owns the lateral activities (such as, for instance, the 
restaurants, or the ski resorts), as well, has a high incentive to pay the devel-
oper a large amount, in order to make sure that the hotel is built rather than 
the second home. Indeed, when the hotel is built, the integrated hotel owner 
not only benefits from the revenue of the hotel activity, but it also (differently 
than under the fragmented ownership framework), increases its profit thanks 
to the lateral activities. Therefore, when the hotel owner is integrated in the 
lateral activities, the number of hotels tends to increase. This is also optimal 
from the viewpoint of the community, as it reduces seasonality thereby guar-
anteeing a more uniform flow of tourists all year long.
Key in our mechanism is the “value of holiday security”, that is, the value placed 
by individuals on the certainty of finding an available spot for the desired time 
spells at the selected destination. While we recognize that second homes pur-
chase decisions involve a great deal of complex variables, our model focuses 
on one specific aspect, and provides, in our view, valuable testable implica-
tions. If the previous argument is correct, however, a puzzle persists. Why 
doesn’t either an integrated ownership structure or side-payments among the 
various actors emerge as an equilibrium of the game? The prevalence of a dis-
persed structure over an integrated one can be a�ributed to a variety of rea-
sons, among which we believe the following are the most prominent. . First, 
historical reasons coupled with some market frictions that preclude efficient 
transactions and a transition towards a single ownership mechanism. Second, 
capital market imperfections, by limiting the capital available to the firms, 
reduce its size. Third, local policy arrangements that tend to favor dispersed 
over concentrated ownership.
Our results entail a strategy suggestion for hotel owners, who should, when-
ever possible,   horizontally integrate  into the lateral industrial activities of 
the destination  (for instance, restaurants and amenities), in order to be able to 
fully capture its  potential value; alternatively, if fragmented ownership, due 
to financial or regulatory constraints, has to be preserved,  the hotels should 
coordinate and team up into consortia, in order to facilitate the emergence of 
procedures that internalize the externality through side-payments, or provide 
forms of joint ownership of the resort lateral industrial activities by the vari-
ous hotel owners.
The results also suggest some policy implications. First and foremost, any 
regulation that explicitly favors second homes at the expenses of hotels is in-
efficient, from the viewpoint of the community. Second, any regulation that 
favors fragmented over concentrated ownership at a destination tends to ex-
acerbate the inefficiencies of building homes over hotels (and hence should 
be banned). Third, under dispersed ownership, side payments among the 
various operators, as well as forms of mixed ownership of related activities 
shouldn’t be prohibited (rather, if anything, they should be encouraged. The 
results of the paper suggest that specific laws, prescribing that a certain pro-
portion of the new structures should consist of hotels, might be welfare-en-
hancing. However, this specific point deserves a word of caution, motivated 
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by two reasons. First, any of these “top-down” policy measures might gener-
ate a number of unintended consequences; a valid assessment of such policies 
therefore requires a more careful analysis. Second, even without assuming 
unintended consequences, a specific law favoring hotels over second homes 
could ultimately determine an excess of hotels over second homes (a possible 
outcome when the initial number of hotels is sufficiently high), thereby reduc-
ing the aggregate welfare for the community. A market-based approach, con-
sisting in integrated ownership, or, if possible, in self-sustaining mechanisms 
of side-payments, is therefore largely preferable to a top-down regulated ap-
proach.
Finally, a word on the interpretation of parameter values. Our findings show 
that the inefficiency of the fragmented structure emerges when the initial 
number of hotels is low. A resort with a limited amount of hotels (and frag-
mented ownership, lack of side-payment, and no other forms of incentives 
for hotels) lies in a vicious circle where the inefficiency persists unless some 
of the structural aspects of the economy change. This “second homes trap” 
affects a number of resorts, mostly ski resorts, where, in the presence of few 
hotels, there does not seem to be an incentive to increase the hotel supply, but 
rather to build new second homes. We believe that a promising future line of 
research should consider the impact effects, measured in terms of costs and 
generation of employment in the local community, under a direct policy to 
build hotels. Our guess, however, is that the tourism multiplier effect on lo-
cal economic development is higher for hotels, as hotel guests tend to have 
a higher average daily per capita expenditure (in terms of indirect tourism 
expenses). In addition, for further research we may consider, for instance, 
incorporating important aspects of tax revenue generation from those two 
investments into hotels and second homes. Hotels generate sales tax (VAT) 
special bed tax and property tax, and the second homes are also contribut-
ing substantial tax revenues from property tax to local governments.  Second 
Homes put in rental pools generate sales tax and bed tax as units are leased 
out as vacation homes. 
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